Art as an alternative investment

Transcript

Art as an alternative investment
magisfinance.it
Art as an alternative investment
Giovanni Fulci, FRM, Banca MPS
Workshop, 4‐6 April 2014, University of Siena
1. HNWIs asset allocation and investment of passion
2. Home bias: a common theme in finance and private art collections
3. A multifactor approach for unbundling the risk/return of artworks:
‐ Psychic dividend: dimensions and estimation
‐ Illiquidity premium
‐ Systematic Risk Premium of art ‐ Individual Artist (Idiosyncratic risk/return)
‐ Single artwork (Idiosyncratic risk/return)
Partners
The winner takes all ‐> money + media coverage
92% of lots sold for less than 50,000 €
1,3%
60%
60% of sales volume is made up by just 1,3% of lots
Source: author’s calculation based on data from “TEFAF Art Market Report 2014”, C. Mc Andrew, Arts Economics, Maastricht
HNWIs Financial Asset Allocation: conservativeness and home bias
Art demand, as luxury item, is an increasing function of wealth
Positive shock to income/wealth increase the demand to art (i.e., durable luxury goods in inelastic supply) HNWIs Asset Allocation show:
‐ An overall conservative investment approach ‐
safety and capital preservation (i.e. ~30% held
in Cash/Deposits)
‐ North America: more aggressive portfolio (highest Equity and lowest Cash/Deposit
exposure, balanced by the highest allocation
to Fixed Income)
‐ Japan: defensive posture, with the highest
allocation to Cash/Deposit
‐ Home bias (see next slide)
HNWIs definition: investable assets > 1ml Usd, excluding primary residence, collectibles, consumables, and consumer durables.
Source: Capgemini/RBC Wealth Management ,“2013 World Wealth Report (WWR)”, 20 June 2013
HNWIs Financial Asset Allocation: conservativeness and home bias
HNWIs Asset Allocation ‐ Home bias
‐ HNWIs are biased to invest close to home
‐ 74%‐80% of HNWIs wealth is invested in their
home region
‐ Lower ‘home’ allocation for Middle East and Africa, at 65%
HNWIs Financial Asset Allocation: conservativeness and home bias
Source of charts and table: author’s calculation based on data from Bloomberg Finance LP
HNWIs Investment of Passion Asset Allocation
HNWIs Investment of Passion
‐ Jewelry, Gems and Watches are the preferred
assets (31,6%)
‐ Art is the 4° largest exposure (16,9%)
‐ Driven by auction houses, Art market is the more lively and dynamic category
HNWIs Investment of Passion Asset Allocation
‐ HNWIs definition: net wealth > 30mlUsd
‐ Higher wealth, more prudent/absolute return
portfolios’ attitude
Source: Knight Frank, ’The Wealth Report 2013’, Knight Frank Research
Home bias: a common theme in finance and private art collections
Finance home bias:
1. Strong home bias in finance: it’s a rational behaviour only if investors believe (and succeed at) that they are better
able to evaluate local firms than firms located in other countries. That is not true: lower financial return/underdiversified portfolios
Art home bias:
1. Collector have a tendency to acquire art objects related to their own cultural area (focus on national, regional or local artist; artworks that show local landscapes or person dressed according to local custom; special attachment for artists sharing the same culture, history; patriotic approach). This preference seems strong in emerging markets
(Russia, China, India). The class of newly rich seek to buy back their art heritage
2. Legal barriers restricting international transactions and/or import tariffs
Makes sense from a non‐financial perspective: ‐ art is a component of cultural capital/national heritage;
‐ brings esteem in social environment;
‐ psychic return related to both direct enjoyment of artwork (aesthetic return) and footprint of social status
(*) Forbes, September 2013, “Art Collector Database Larry’s List Launches”, http://www.forbes.com/sites/natalierobehmed/2013/09/19/art‐collector‐database‐larrys‐list‐launches/
(*) Lasse Steiner, Bruno S. Frey and Magnus Resch, working paper, November 2013, ‘’Home Is Where Your Art Is: The Home Bias of Art Collectors’’, http://www.ec on.uzh.ch/static/wp/econwp135.pdf
Home bias: a common theme in finance and private art collections
“Everyone talks about artists and artworks, but little is known about art collectors,…”, Magnus Resch, Founder, Larry’s List (*) 2013 saw the launch of Larry’s List, a guide on the international art collector scene. Larry’s List contains over 3,119 of the world’s most prominent and also less known art collectors from 71 countries.
Data is manually researched using over 27’000 sources, updated constantly only from public sources in 20 languages.
The team is composed of 25 researchers of 20 nationalities.
DATA
2679 unique collections from 71 countries
Data collected in 2013
European collections contain 43% of artworks with European origin
Strong relative home bias for:
South America: 77% = 89% ‐ 12%
Arabia: 77% = 85% ‐ 8%
Africa: 68% = 69% ‐ 1%
Asia: 58% = 82% ‐ 24%
Less strong relative home bias for:
Europe: 25% = 43% ‐ 18%
North America: 40% = 76% ‐ 36%
(*) Forbes, September 2013, “Art Collector Database Larry’s List Launches”, http://www.forbes.com/sites/natalierobehmed/2013/09/19/art‐collector‐database‐larrys‐list‐launches/
(*) Lasse Steiner, Bruno S. Frey and Magnus Resch, working paper, November 2013, ‘’Home Is Where Your Art Is: The Home Bias of Art Collectors’’, http://www.ec on.uzh.ch/static/wp/econwp135.pdf
Home bias: a common theme in finance and private art collections
Close connection between the location of the sale and the type of art sold
In Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and Netherlands the number of sales of domestic works far outnumbers that of other nationalities
The relative importance of domestic art is
substantially lower in UK and US
(i)
Return and Fundamental in the Art Market, 11/2010, C. Spaenjers, working paper, Department of Finance, CentER, Tilburg University
Home bias: a common theme in finance and private art collections
Example: Indian Art Market (i)
Approximate sales of Indian art worldwide
Indian Art Buyers
Approx sales figures of all Auctions / Gallerys / Private Dealers / Consultants /
Promoters / Artist studio etc. Public and private sales of Indian art across the world (*).
Example: academic studies/survey (ii)
In recent years, home bias has been particularly evident in emerging markets such as China,India (see above) and Russia, where the new rich are buying back their heritage (Renneboog and Spaenjers, 2010). Survey evidence indicates that a home bias in taste is also relevant in developed economies:
1. 47% of the Finns interviewed by the Dia Center for the Arts (1997) indicated that they prefer Finnish art over art from other countries
2. Only 2% of the Dutch respondents, but 49% of the U.S. ones, chose American art over art from other regions. (i)
(ii)
http://www.theartstrust.com/Market_analysis.aspx
Return and Fundamental in the Art Market, 11/2010, C. Spaenjers, working paper, Department of Finance, CentER, Tilburg University
A new multifactor approach for unbundling the risk/return of artworks
Total Return of Art Investment (net of risk‐free rate)
= Psychic Dividend
+
Systematic Financial Return (Systematic Risk Premium + Illiquidity Risk premium)
+
Individual Artist Excess Return (Idiosyncratic Return/Risk not explained by systematic risk premiums)
+
Single Artwork Excess Return (Idiosyncratic Return/Risk not explained by individual artist ‘index’)
–
Costs
Art is a hybrid: unlike ‘pure’ financial instruments, art is also a conspicuous consumption good
Artworks are heterogeneous assets, not commoditized like stocks/equities
Psychic dividend of art possession compensates art investors, so that they need less financial return for the same amount of financial risks (systematic, illiquidity and idiosyncratic risks) incurred.
Aggregate financial returns of art investments hence can be (theoretically and empirically) lower than those provided by other
financial investment: the difference must be attributed to the psychic dividend to the ownership of the art object.
Notwitstanding that, buying/collecting artworks is a rational economic choice if psychic dividend are considered.
Psychic dividend
Aestethic experience: enjoyment of displaying artworks on the wall rather than (now electronic) stock/debt certificates
1866
2007
Is it all about individual, intimate aesthetic experience?
Psychic dividend: dimensions
‘In order to gain and to hold the esteem of men, wealth must be put in evidence, for esteem is awarded only on evidence’, T. Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class, 1899
Dimensions of artworks’ psychic dividend (i) (ii) (iii)
‐ Veblen effects: two psychological aspects of purchasing prestige goods/conspicuous goods in order to advertise wealth: 1. wish to equal somebody ( “pecuniary emulation”); 2. desire to outstrip others (“invidious comparison”‐> distinguish himself from member of lower class).
‐ Social significance: manifesting affiliation to a particular social group (artworks of national heritage/historical/religious theme)
‐ Social status of the owner: family tradition/it also depends upon perception of own’s wealth among social contacts ‐ Aestethic experience: enjoyment of displaying artworks on the wall
‐ Individual benefit: increase of self‐esteem, possessing/adding to a collection of items; joy of collecting
‐ Process of art’s purchase may be a pleasure in itself: participating in art auctions, being a regular customer of art galleries
Collectors and their motivations (iv)
TRADITIONALIS 16%:
INVESTORS 24% (the newcomer):
‐ By collecting, they continue a family tradition
‐ collecting as an investment opportunity
‐ joy of speculating with artworks and collectable objects
‐ opportunity to express one’s own position in society/status symbol
ART AFICIONADOS 37%:
‐ collecting out of passion
‐ opportunity to express part of one’s own personality
‐ new contacts or friendships through art
HYBRID COLLECTORS 23%
(i) Reconsidering Psychic Return in Art Investments, 2013, Guido Candela, Massimiliano Castellani, Pierpaolo Pattitoni, working paper, University of Bologna
(ii) Investment in Art – Specificity, Risk, and Rates of Return, 2012, J. Bialynicka‐Birula, working paper, Cracow University of Economics
(iii) Veblen Effects in a Theory of Conspicuous Consumption, 1996, L. S. Bagwell and B. D. Bernheim, The American Economic Review, Vol. 86, No. 3. (Jun., 1996), pp. 349‐373
(iv) Collecting in the Digital Age, AXA Art / Insurance 2014, March 2014, online survey of 972 Western collectors: ~800 European collectors (v) RBC‐Capgemini Global Wealth Management‐Financial Advisor Survey, 2011, 42% of advisors believe that their HNWIs clients buy art mainly for its potential of price appreciation.
Psychic dividend: estimation
1. Willingness‐to‐pay a rental fee for an artwork
Rental price might provide a proxy for the psychic dividend from investing in an art object.
Renting or leasing an artwork involves the possession of the art object without having its actual ownership.
Thus there is no concern about the financial returns of the artwork: one is solely paying fow viewing the object and enjoying
any other intangible returns it yields.
Example of art rental price (% of total value of artwork)
Monthly payment: 2% (minimum period 6 months) ‐> ~24% annually
Example of art lease program (i.e., with the option to buy)
Monthly lease payment: 2,5% (minimum lease period 12 months) ‐> ~24% annually + ~6% value of call option
Example of museum loan agreement
Problem: Incomplete aspect of the art market: Graeser (1993) attributes this to the agency problem: «the lack of motivation in the renter to preserve and protect the aesthetic object as would an owner‐in‐possession» (*) On the valuation of psychic returns to art market investments, 2007, Erdal Atukeren and Aylin Seckin, working paper, ETHZ KOF‐Swiss Economic Institute and Instabul Bilgi University
Psychic dividend: estimation
2. CAPM Alpha: estimation at index level
Stein (1977) proposed that Alpha parameter should be taken as
measure of returns from the viewing service of an artwork
SML
Beta
Several academic studies found, for a typical long term passive (and not investable) exposure to the art market as a whole:
‐ Usually low beta (<1) vs equity markets
‐ Negative/zero alpha (not statistically significant in most studies)
‐ Positive real return
Alpha ‐> psychic dividend net of:
1. Cost of ownership (Insurance and maintenance cost)
2. Transaction costs
+ 3. Premium to account for illiquidity of artwork
Alpha seems statistically not different from zero ‐> take‐away: psychic dividend is on average balanced by the three elements above…..alpha arbitraged away?
(*) On the valuation of psychic returns to art market investments, 2007, Erdal Atukeren and Aylin Seckin, working paper, ETHZ KOF‐Swiss Economic Institute and Instabul Bilgi University
Psychic dividend: estimation
2. CAPM Alpha: estimation at index level
By applying an opportunity cost framework (based on the analytical tool of portfolio theory), Candela et al. 2013 (*) estimated a psychic dividend of ~0,6%‐1,8% quarterly for Artprice indices (1990‐2011)
(*) Reconsidering Psychic Return in Art Investments, 2013, Guido Candela, Massimiliano Castellani, Pierpaolo Pattitoni, working paper, University of Bologna
A new multifactor approach for unbundling the risk/return of artworks
Total Return of Art Investment (net of risk‐free rate)
= Psychic Dividend
+
Systematic Financial Return (Systematic Risk Premium + Illiquidity Risk premium)
+
Individual Artist Excess Return (Idiosyncratic Return/Risk not explained by systematic risk premiums)
+
Single Artwork Excess Return (Idiosyncratic Return/Risk not explained by individual artist ‘index’)
–
Costs
Illiquidity premium: causes, consequences, estimation and portfolio choice
Illiquidity premium is the extra‐return that investors earn given their inability to access capital immediately
Characteristics of illiquid asset:
‐ Long time between trading/liquidity event
‐ Large transaction costs
‐ Information asymmetries
‐ Heterogeneity
Reported returns are biased/not investable:
‐ Perceived risk less than actual risk
‐ Sample selection bias
‐ Survivorship bias
Estimation and portfolio choices with illiquid assets:
‐ Optimal allocation
‐ Estimated Illiquidity premium
(*) Source: A. Ang
Most individuals have the majority of their wealth (90%) in illiquid assets (house); UHNWI allocate 5%‐20% to illiquid treasures assets
(*) Asset Management: A Systematic Approach to Factor Investing, 2013, Draft, Book Chapter: ‘Illiquid Asset Investing’, A. Ang, Columbia Business School, http://www.columbia.edu/~aa610/
Illiquidity premium: causes, consequences, estimation and portfolio choice
Characteristics of illiquid asset:
‐ Long time between trading/liquidity event
‐ Large transaction costs
‐ Information asymmetries
‐ Heterogeneity
Reported returns are biased/not investable:
‐ Perceived risk less than actual risk
‐ Sample selection bias
‐ Survivorship bias
Estimation and portfolio choices with illiquid assets:
‐ Optimal allocation
‐ Estimated Illiquidity premium
The closer we observe a phenomenon, the worst it gets (*)
(*) Source: author’s calculation based on data from Bloomberg Finance LP. Data lenght: 18,5 years – from July
1995 to Jan 2014
Illiquidity premium: causes, consequences, estimation and portfolio choice
Characteristics of illiquid asset:
‐ Long time between trading/liquidity event
‐ Large transaction costs
‐ Information asymmetries
‐ Heterogeneity
Reported returns are biased/not investable:
‐ Perceived risk less than actual risk
‐ Sample selection bias
‐ Survivorship bias
Estimation and portfolio choices with illiquid assets:
‐ Optimal allocation
‐ Estimated Illiquidity premium
Sell the winners/hold the losses = disposition effect(*): liquidity events/transactions tend to happen mainly when
prices are high. Art indices calculated with RSR (Repeated
Sales Regression): inclusion in the index is conditional on sale and there may be a relationship between value increases and the occurrence of a transaction. If the price of a painting severely decrease it is usually not resold at auctions. Survivorship bias: Goetzmann (1996) estimates high (20%) “obsolescence” rates for paintings (i.e., the frequency at which they disappear from the auction records over time).
Mitigants: Mei and Moses (2002) point out that these biases are mitigated in part by the Survivorship bias of artists (i.e.,
included data is for artists who are already established and does not capture the initial appreciation of their works) + Museum effect: Goetzmann (1993) notes that high‐value donated works to museums are also censored from the index of returns: a painting donated to/bought by museums doesn’t reappear at auctions
(*) Does it pay to invest in Art? A Selection‐corrected Returns Perspective, 2013, A. Korteweg, R. Kräussl and P. Verwijmeren, Duisenberg school of finance ‐ Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper. The authors built a sample of 42,548 repeated sales of 20,538 unique paintings (a subset of the online database provided by Blouin Art Sales Index‐BASI, a collection of auctions results from more than 350 auction houses: it contains ~4,6ml works of art by more than
225,000 artists. The authors focused only on painting (2,3ml works) for the period 1972‐2010. 25% (22%) of sales take place at Sotheby’s (Christies). Average time between sales is 7,6 years. The authors calculated an annual return of 10%, that if corrected for selection bias/disposition effect is lowered to 6,5% (a difference of 3,5%) , and the Sharpe ratio drop from 0,24 to 0,04.
Illiquidity premium: causes, consequences, estimation and portfolio choice
Illiquidity premium is the extra‐return that investors earn given their inability to access capital immediately
Characteristics of illiquid asset:
‐ Long time between trading/liquidity event
‐ Large transaction costs
‐ Information asymmetries
‐ Heterogeneity
Reported returns are biased/not investable:
‐ Perceived risk less than actual risk
‐ Sample selection bias
‐ Survivorship bias
Estimation and portfolio choices with illiquid assets:
‐ Optimal allocation
‐ Estimated Illiquidity premium
(*) Source: Author calculation based on data from A. Ang, 2013
Less liquidity of an asset means smaller portfolio allocation and higher required risk premium
(*) Asset Management: A Systematic Approach to Factor Investing, 2013, Draft, Book Chapter: ‘Illiquid Asset Investing’, A. Ang, Columbia Business School, http://www.columbia.edu/~aa610/
A new multifactor approach for unbundling the risk/return of artworks
Total Return of Art Investment (net of risk‐free rate)
= Psychic Dividend
+
Systematic Financial Return (Systematic Risk Premium + Illiquidity Risk premium)
+
Individual Artist Excess Return (Idiosyncratic Return/Risk not explained by systematic risk premiums)
+
Single Artwork Excess Return (Idiosyncratic Return/Risk not explained by individual artist ‘index’)
–
Costs
Systematic Risk Premium: Art returns
Differences in database/methodology/period lead
to different results:
‐ Earlier studies show lower returns
‐ More recent studies show improved returns
Estimated real financial returns on art are between ~0,6% ‐ ~5% :
median ~2,6%
Estimated real financial return on art is low (0,6%‐5%)
(i)
(ii)
Art as an Investment and Conspicuous Consumption Good, 2009, B. R. Mandel, American Economic Review 2009, 99:4, 1653–1663
Buying Beauty: On Prices and Returns in the Art Market, 2012, L. Renneboog and C. Spaenjers, working paper,Tilburg University and HEC Paris
Systematic Risk Premium: Art return and risk
(*) data source: http://imgpublic.artprice.com/pdf/agi.xls
Fine Art and High Finance: Expert Advice on the Economics of Ownership, May 2010,C. McAndrew, John Wiley & Sons. http://www.artprice.com. Data: 520,000 artists, 4,500 auction houses worldwide, databank of 27ml items.
Systematic Risk Premium: Art return and risk
Co‐downside risk of art and equity, although
time‐varying, seems
elevated in the last ~15years Systematic Risk Premium: Art return and risk
Data: AMR – ArtMarketResearch, 200 monthly data starting in 1986 (~17years). AMR data uses average returns on a 12 month moving average. This leads to a substantial degree of smoothing of the historical data series.
EA= Optimal (Tangency) Emotional Asset Portfolio:
82% wine, 15% art, 4% books (*) Emotional Assets and Investment Behavior, 2009, R. A. J. Campbell, C. G. Koedijk, F. A. de Roon, working paper, Maastricht University & Tilburg University, Department of Finance. This study is not reported in the previous
table containing a list of selected academic studies, given its focus on excess return vs risk free, whereas other studies in the table mentioned are instead focuses on nominal and/or real returns. Systematic Risk Premium: Art return and risk
Dimson and Spaenjers (2013) focus on long term return and risk of ‘emotional assets’: art, stamps, violins, wine, diamonds, compared to UK equity, UK government bonds/bills and gold
Data range 1900‐2012 sourced by: 1. UK art auction transaction data (repeated sales) extracted from Reitlinger [1961; 1096 repeated sales pairs till 1961 (buy‐ins
excluded)]
and the Art Sale Index database from 1961 to 2007 (253 repeated sales of artworks mentioned in Reitlinger)
Total of 1349 repeated sales
2. UK art market index calculated by Artprice.com from 2007 to 2012
ART‐> correlation to equity market
Correlation of high‐end UK art market with UK equity: there could be a lag between the wealth generated by the appreciation of financial market and its deployment
in the art market
(i)
(ii)
The Investment Performance of Art and Other Collectibles, 2013, E. Dimson and C. Spaenjers, working paper, London Business School and HEC Paris, in ‘Risk and Uncertainty in the Art World (edited by A. Dempster), Bloomsbury Publishing
The Economic of Taste, 1961, G. Reitlinger. The book investigates the history of British drawings and paintings since 1730 based on UK auction transactions
Systematic Risk Premium: Art return and risk
Art index behaviour:
‐ Positive in: late 60s/early 70s; end of 80s; mid‐2000s.
‐ Negative in: WW1; Great Depression; after 1973 oil crisis; early 90s recession; 2008 financial crisis. Negative shock to wealth depressed high‐end art prices
(i)
The Investment Performance of Art and Other Collectibles, 2013, E. Dimson and C. Spaenjers, working paper, London Business School and HEC Paris, in ‘Risk and Uncertainty in the Art World (edited by A. Dempster), Bloomsbury Publishing
Systematic Risk Premium: Art return and risk
Another recent study (Renneboog and Spaenjers, 2012) with data for 1ml+ transaction for the period
1957 – 2007 (source: Art Sales Index) show:
‐ Higher return in the more recent period
‐ Low correlation with equities
(i)
Buying Beauty: On Prices and Returns in the Art Market, 2012, L. Renneboog and C. Spaenjers, working paper,Tilburg University and HEC Paris
Systematic Risk Premium: Art return and risk
Renneboog and Spaenjers(2012) are the first to focus on the segmentation of art market and returns
across price buckets. Given that:
‐ Small investors are not able to collect high‐end artworks
‐ Wealthy individuals are less tempted to buy in the lower‐end of the market
They found that:
‐ Outperformance of higher quantiles is mainly
due to strong price rise in time of increased
demand for art
‐ Higher return and volatilities in the upper price
range could be associated with income cyclicality
of high‐income individuals
‐ The most expensive part of the market may be more prone to speculation
(i)
Buying Beauty: On Prices and Returns in the Art Market, 2012, L. Renneboog and C. Spaenjers, working paper,Tilburg University and HEC Paris
Systematic Risk Premium: Art return and risk
Spaenjers (2010, data from 1980 till 2007) focused on the segmentation of art market across quality.
Segmentation criteria: lenght of entry (biography
wordcount) in the online encyclopedia Oxford Art Online www.orxfordartonline.com
Significative differences in average prices across these 3 groups (example US‐2007):
‐ Top quality: 1,45ml Usd
‐ Medium quality: 0,47ml Usd
‐ Low quality: 0,11ml Usd
1. Positive relationship between quality and long‐term
returns
2. No free lunch: higher quality ‐> higher volatility
3. Low quality category: negative returns in 4 countries
(i)
Return and Fundamental in the Art Market, 11/2010, C. Spaenjers, working paper, Department of Finance, CentER, Tilburg University
Systematic Risk Premium: correlation of Art and equity market
Campbell (2005) focus on shallower art market downside risk when the equity markets are under stress.
The resilience of art market is caused both by its lower liquidity and from a behavioural bias: investors don’t want to sell artworks (symbol of their status and reputation) during period of equity market downturn
Goetzmann (1993): positive beta of art to the equity market over the long run
Mei and Moses (2002): very low correlation 0,04 between the annual real return of their art index and the S&P500 during 1950‐1999
Pesando and Schum (2008): correlation of 0,21 between semi‐annual return of S&P500 and their art index of modern prints
during 1977‐2004
Renneboog and Spaenjers (2010, Hedonic): correlation of 0,47 between annual real return of global art index and global stock index during 1957‐2007
Hiraki et al. (2009): positive wealth increase of Japanese during 1980s lifted the quotations of art market;
the subsequent equity market bust depressed the quotation of artworks
HYP: there could be a lag between the wealth generated by the appreciation of financial market and its deployment in the art market
(*) Time‐Varying Downside Risk: An Application to the Art Market, 2009, R. Campbell and R. Kraussl, Chapter 1.
A new multifactor approach for unbundling the risk/return of artworks
Total Return of Art Investment (net of risk‐free rate)
= Psychic Dividend
+
Systematic Financial Return (Systematic Risk Premium + Illiquidity Risk premium)
+
Individual Artist Excess Return (Idiosyncratic Return/Risk not explained by systematic risk premiums)
+
Single Artwork Excess Return (Idiosyncratic Return/Risk not explained by individual artist ‘index’)
–
Costs
Individual Artist Return (Idiosyncratic Return)
Change/fluctuation in tastes, reputation driven by
SIGNALS within art markets: Catalogues, Exhibititions, Expert/Collector behaviour, Auction est.
Example: ‘Documenta’ effect. DOCUMENTA takes place every 5 years and is one of the world’s most important exhibitions of modern and contemporary art.
Kraeussl (2013) has analyzed 85,000 sales records for 635 artists featured in the exhibition, spanning the 30 months leading up to and the 30 months following their year of inclusion.
…..next 30months start in Dec14….
Aftereffects on prices and volumes
Effect of ‘information age’
(*) ‘The Documenta Effect’, 11/2013, R. Kraeussl, ART+AUCTION, DATABANK, BLOUINARTINFO.COM Individual Artist Return (Idiosyncratic Return)
HOLDING PERIOD
Example: conventional wisdom dictates the optimal holding period before selling an artwork is 7 years, because price will suffer
if a work re‐enter the auction market after a too short timeframe
This hypothesis has been tested with a database of nearly 30,000 resales, with artworks that were sold at auction at least twice between 1985 and 2012. The 7 years rule‐of‐thumb generally held up in all categories except Contemporary art.
2 periods: 1985‐2001 and 2002‐2012
Shorter holding periods (<5y) commanded
negative return in 1985‐2001 for all categories
That relationship flipped for Post‐War and Contemporary art in 2002‐2012……
HYP1: a painting trade when a threshold of price appreciation has been hit. Quicker
rotation/lower holding period is driven by faster price appreciation
HYP2: trading intensity accelerates with higher realised return of artworks
(i) ‘To Have and to Hold?’, July‐August/2013, R. Kraeussl, ART+AUCTION, DATABANK, BLOUINARTINFO.COM
(ii) Does it pay to invest in Art? A Selection‐corrected Returns Perspective, 2013, A. Korteweg, R. Kräussl and P. Verwijmeren, Duisenberg school of finance ‐ Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper. The authors built a sample of 42,548 repeated sales of 20,538 unique paintings (a subset of the online database provided by Blouin Art Sales Index‐BASI, that collects auctions results from more than 350 auction houses and contains ~4,6ml works of art by more than 225,000 artists. The authors focused only on painting (2,3ml works) and on the period 1972‐2010. 25% (22%) of sales take place at Sotheby’s (Christies). Average time between sales is 7,6 years. magisfinance.it
Art as an alternative investment
Giovanni Fulci, FRM, Banca MPS
Workshop, 4‐6 April 2014, University of Siena
Main takeaway
Art seems dominated in the financial risk/return dimensions by traditional asset classes (i.e., equities, bonds, etc)
We find that downside correlation of art with traditonal asset classes is higher than reported in previous works
Art, as luxury consumption goods market, is driven by consumption of HNWIs, that in turn is driven by GDP growth and
(lagged) equity markets returns
A new multifactor approach for unbundling the risk/return of artworks is proposed
Optimal portfolio allocation is more a function of individual standing power vs illiquid exposures instead of what is suggested by standard asset allocation framework based on past realised risk/return/correlation
Inflation protection
High but decreasing information asymmetries: information age
Art in any case is a rational investment choice given the psychic/non‐financial dividend delivered to the owner‐in‐possession
of artworks