Lampedusa: the Island of Conflicts - UvA-DARE

Lampedusa: the Island of Conflicts
Clash of Frames on the Southern Boundary of
Europe
Rosa Monicelli
Master’s thesis in Sociology – Ethnic and Migration Studies
University of Amsterdam, March 2013
Student Number: 5912377
First Reader: Dr. Walter Nicholls
Second Reader: Dr. Olga Sezneva
Contents
1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 3
2. Theoretical Framework ................................................................................................................ 5
Post-National and Multiculturalist Theories ............................................................... 6
National Oriented Theories .............................................................................................. 7
The Localist Theory ............................................................................................................. 9
Intermingling of Scales ..................................................................................................... 11
3. Methodology .................................................................................................................................. 12
Discourse Analysis.............................................................................................................. 12
The Fieldwork ..................................................................................................................... 13
The “others” Lampedusians ........................................................................................... 14
4. The Case Study ............................................................................................................................. 15
Mapping the Place ............................................................................................................. 15
The Legal Context .............................................................................................................. 18
The Emergency ................................................................................................................... 22
The Border Show: Lampedusa....................................................................................... 25
5. Dominant Interpretative Frame: “Immigrati are a Threat” ........................................ 27
6. Interpretative Frame of Resistance: “We”, the Civic Society ...................................... 32
Motivation Frames ............................................................................................................ 32
Diagnostic Frames ............................................................................................................. 35
Prognostic Frames .............................................................................................................. 37
7. Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................... 39
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................................ 43
Appendix 1 ............................................................................................................................................ 45
Appendix 2 ............................................................................................................................................ 46
Appendix 3 ............................................................................................................................................ 49
Appendix 4 ............................................................................................................................................ 53
1. Introduction
During the first months of 2010, Italy has had to face a situation of emergency,
caused by the increasing flows of people who, fleeing from the North-African uprisings,
were trying to reach Europe in search of a better future. Lampedusa is a small island of
the Mediterranean Sea, equidistant from the North-African and the Sicilian shores. Due
to its particular position, the island has been a transit point for migrants crossing the
Mediterranean Sea over the centuries; when ‘the emergency’ started, Lampedusa and
its inhabitants were suddenly put under the world’s spotlights, being the symbol of the
danger that was about to threaten the whole Europe. With the increasing interest of
the mass media in the Lampedusian situation, the Italian government and the
institutions began planning and enacting a political strategy aimed at increasing the
security of Italians against the foreign visitors. Lampedusa was the focus of the new
strategy and, during the following months, the decisions taken by the State in matter of
immigration radically changed the perception of the immigrants in the mind of Italians
and in those of Lampedusians themselves. The interpretation of the phenomenon given
by the central State, and reproduced by media, became dominant, in a country already
dominated by a racist and xenophobic vision of immigrants since the first immigration
flows in the Nineties. The definition of migrants as ‘outcasts’ and harmful to the
external image of Italy, had a particularly strong impact on the inhabitant of
Lampedusa, who became strong supporters of the repressive political measures
enacted by the government. They feared that the new waves of immigrants could harm
the tourism industry, the main source of income of the island. The EU parliament and
the EU state-members contributed to the promotion of this vision, pushing the Italian
government to enact policies aimed at keeping migrants outside the European borders.
Lampedusa symbolized the Southern border of Europe, the external wall of a fortress
that should not be climbed; the migrants were considered as a threat to the European
unity.
Nevertheless, not everybody accepted the interpretation given by the
institutions. A group of young people, born and raised in Lampedusa, decided to
counteract this way of conceiving and responding to the Lampedusian events. The
organization Askavusa, since 2009, has been working on the construction of a new
interpretative frame of the migration flows, one that would frame Lampedusians and
migrants as co-participant of a common destiny and that would aim at the reconstruction of a sense of community that got lost after the beginning of ‘the
emergency’.
My goal with this research is to show the mechanisms of construction of new
interpretative frames by a community, in opposition to the top-down interpretations of
the state. My leading research questions will be: how do people resist to the dominant
discourse in cross-border regions? And how do they create alternative interpretative
frames to do so? I conducted my fieldwork in Lampedusa in the summer of 2011 and in
the summer of 2012. On these occasions, I had the chance to come in close contact with
the islanders and with the activists of the movement Askavusa; what became
interesting after the first weeks, was that the concern for their own island and the
preservation of their territory was strongly connected with the fight for migrant rights
they were conducting. A third important question came up spontaneously: does
locality and place-framing matters in social movement for migrants rights in crossborder regions? And through what mechanisms such relation is created?
The interesting sociological puzzle I want to address, is whether social
movements for migrants rights can be constructed locally, at the level of community,
rather than being imposed up-down, and how geographical scales can intersect giving
rise to transnational movements.
I will first provide an overview of the sociological theory on geographical scales
of social movements, describing the different approaches and trying to synthesize
them in order to create a coherent theoretical framework. I will then explain the
methodologies used and a description of my fieldwork in Lampedusa, analysing the
difficulties and limits I’ve had to face.
In the third chapter, I will give an overview of the geographical and political context
where my research takes place, describing the events that lead to the present situation.
It will follow a section dedicated to the analysis of how the dominant perception of
migrants as dangerous element of disruption was constructed and reproduced by
media. In the sixth chapter I will present an accurate analysis of the mechanisms of
contruction of the alternative interpretative frames made by the activists of Askavusa,
comparing it with the dominant view imposed by State and institutions.
I will conclude that, through place-framing, activists fighting for the rights are migrants
are able to construct a new idea of community based on universal values like freedom
and dignity.
2. Theoretical framework
Few authors have approached the issue of the relationship between social
movements and geographical scales from a variety of perspectives. I will present here
three different positions: the post-national theory, the national-oriented theory and the
localist theory. Even though the Localist approach will be my main theoretic frame of
reference, as well as the methodology adopted by Martin (Martin, 2008), I will suggest
in the last section an alternative hypothesis that combines the three positions, that I
will refer to as Entangling Perspectives.
Post-National and Multiculturalist Theories
Many scholars have claimed that the nation-state’s role as the main unit of
social organization and its presumed authority and legitimacy and the liberal and
universalist values that support it are being eroded by few factors proper of the
contemporary society. There are different theoretical models supporting the vision of
an increasingly weak nation-state, all connected with the idea of a global and pluralist
citizenship. I will briefly describe two main branches of this theory: the Post-national
Citizenship and the Multiculturalist approach.
The first position - that sees post-national citizenship as the new form of citizenship–
is well summarized in the words of Jacobson: ”Transnational migration is steadily
eroding the traditional basis of nation-state membership, namely citizenship. As rights
have come to be predicated on residency, not citizen status, the distinction between
‘citizen’ and ‘alien’ has eroded” (Jacobson, 1996: 8). In this vision, the claims-making of
migrants would transcend the frontiers of the nation-state and make reference to the
universal rights of personhood and human rights, undermining the authority of the
national institutions.
A second branch of scholarship suggests that the capacity of cohesion and
nation identity of the nation state would be at stake because of a new form of
citizenship called multicultural citizenship. Scholars like Kymlicka and Young suggest
that the concept of a unified, undifferentiated citizenship would be undermined by the
claims and demands for recognition of their minorities and specific identities made by
migrants (Kymlicka, 1995 and Young, 1998).
What these theoretical approaches tri to suggest, is that the nation-state is no
longer the frame of reference of the immigrants’ protests. In this vision, migrants
would ground their claims referring to their own identities, universal or specific, so
bypassing the criteria of inclusion established by the state: community – human,
religious, cultural, etc. – is reaffirmed over nationality.
National Oriented Theories
Scholars like Koopmans (Koopmans, 1999), disagree with the aforementioned
scholars, claiming that the nation-state continues to be by far the most important
frame of reference for the identification and claims of the migrants. Moreover, he
suggests that “national authorities remain the almost exclusive addresses of the
demands of these minorities”. He concludes that “European integration has not
progress nearly as far as the rethoric of both proponents and opponents of this project
would have us believe” (Koopmans, 1999: 689).
In line with Koopmans, Nicholls (Nicholls, forthcoming) makes interesting
observations about the modes of action of migrants. His central argument is that the
participation of migrants in social movements has often the effect of reproducing the
national discourses and ideas that make that regime exclusionary. In order to gain
legitimacy into the public sphere, the migrants are represented by the support
organizations as conforming to the national criteria of social inclusion. Non-nationals
must show the nationals they have adhered to their social rules and incorporated their
cultural values and practices and they are on the right way to full integration and
acculturation. This process entails the exclusion of the migrants with the weakest
chances of success, the alienation of migrants from the public arena as well as from the
means of communication, leaving much power in the hands of the support
organizations. At the same time, such way of framing the collective action has the
advantage of ensuring successes and positive results in a relatively short time. Nicholls
suggests that participation of migrants in social movement can become a means to
normalize and nationalize the foreigner, rather than to make his diversity accepted and
included into the host society.
Koopmans and Nicholls both argue that national institutions and normative
structures continue to shape how immigrant rights activists make their claims in the
public sphere. While they recognize tendencies towards transnationalisms, national
norms and political institutions continue to be the principal forces shaping their
interventions in the public sphere.
Another interesting approach, is that of Giugni and Passy (Giugni and Passy,
2004), who describe the model of citizenship operative in Italy – defined as the
combination between the prevailing conception of nationhood (criteria of citizenship)
and the cultural obligations posed on immigrants to be accepted into the national
community – as ethnic-assimilationist. This model combines an ethnic definition of
nationhood and citizenship (jus sanguinis is the main criteria of access to citizenship in
Italy; jus soli becomes effective just if co-related to other conditions) with an
assimilationist view of cultural obligations (even if less regulated that in other
countries, the adherence of foreigners to Italian rules and values is considered a
fundamental condition for their access to citizenship). This setting makes it very
difficult for foreigners to become real citizens and members of the national community.
The authors define the model as “a regime of incorporation that pushes towards
assimilation to the norms and values of the national community on en ethnocultural
basis and tends to exclude those who are not entitled to sharing its norms, values and
symbols” (Giugni and Passy, 2004:58). We can agree or not with such definition, but
their findings on the modes of access of the migrants to the public arena and the
content of their claims can be comparable to the Italian situation. In fact, the authors
show that in a regime like Switzerland’s, migrants mostly mobilize around issues
connected to their homeland, since the specific criteria of access to citizenship of the
host country don’t permit to them to feel sense of belonging and legitimation into the
public sphere. Since the central conflict in this case is the lack of social recognition, the
content of their claims mainly refer to issues of immigration, asylum and modes of
expulsion and repatriation promoted by the host country.
The Localist Theory
Deborah Martin (Martin, 2008) takes another perspective on the issue, shedding
light on the importance of community and locality as frames of reference for social
movements. She refers to the theories of Wilson and Grammenos (Wilson and
Grammenos, 2000) arguing that space influences the formation of collective identities
and activist agendas. What articulates the relationship between place and activism are
frames, a concept explored and studied mainly by Goffman and Snow. She agrees with
Snow and Benford (Snow and Benford, 1988) that social movements draw upon social
identities to foster collective activism, by framing their goals and activities in order to
appeal to the collective group. “Collective action frames denote how social movements
articulate issues, values and concerns in ways that foster collective identities and
activism” (Martin, 2008:733). Frames can be defined as discourses, since they are
collective organizational narratives, combining the variety of cultural values within a
social group with the deliberate choices and framing selections operated by the
activists. Frames are contradictory and change over-time, rather than being fixed and
cohesive. Martin stresses the necessity of further exploring the meaning and
representations of activism at a local level. This can be done by studying the
construction of place frames, since they describe the common experiences among
people in a place together with their scope and scale. “Studying place-frames” – she
argues – “provides the conceptual framework for understanding how community
organizations create a discursive place-identity to situate and legitimate their activism”
(Martin, 2008:733). This approach seems to be particularly useful to our scopes,
specifically in regards to the methodology used. In her research, Martin focuses on the
collective framing of neighbourhood organizations in St. Paul, Minnesota. In her
analysis, she individuates three dimensions of the collective action frames: the
motivational frames, the diagnostic frames and the prognostic frames. Later on we will
get deeper into the functioning of these mechanisms, in relation to our case study. For
now, I will give a brief definition of these conceptual tools. The ‘motivational frames’
can be described as those frames that articulate the community values. The activists
identify themselves as the political subjects belonging to the place and exhort people to
act; they present actors as sharing the same characteristics, rather than being diverse.
The ‘diagnostic frames’ describe the place or the community as ’it should be’ in their
shared imaginary. They indicate what are the problems and the elements ‘out of place’.
The effect of such framing is to conceptually and physically broaden the scope of the
actions, beyond the boundaries of the community and to bring the issues at a national
or supra-national scale. Finally, through what Martin calls the ‘prognostic frames’, the
actors indicate the possible solutions and approach to the issue. The aim here is to
promote a ‘sense of place’ and ‘community’. The author conducts an interesting
discourse analysis of the claims of the organizations studied, concluding that these
groups use their territorially bounded political identity in order to legitimate
themselves as political actors and to foster cohesion and concern at the communityscale. They do so through place-frames, that discursively legitimate the local sphere of
action, but addressing the regional and national institutions for the solution of their
problems. The author argues: “this analysis demonstrates how local communities
constitute their territorial legitimacy and meaningful site for activism” (Martin,
2008:747).
Intermingling of scales
The approaches described so far focus on the different geographical arenas
(transnational, national, local), shaping social movements. We may conclude that,
while the national context plays an important role in shaping the discourses produced
in social movements, localities also seem to be an important arena for generating new
frames in these kinds of struggles. My research clearly shows that, despite the actors
involved in social movements on the island strongly define themselves and frame their
action as alternative and opposed with the institutional ones, they necessarily need to
constantly refer to the national frame of reference. This shapes their opportunities to
raise their own voices and the content of their claims. In this perspective, the theory of
Giugni and Passy, when integrated with the localist approach adopted by Martin, can
serve to he explanation of the object of my research.
I argue that resistance discourses intermingle between transnational, national
and local scales. Activists on both sides of the issues refer to these different imaginaries
when constructing their claims for and against immigrants. What emerges from my
research is that activists elect their own territory as the main frame of reference for the
construction of their interpretation of phenomena, This becomes clear in the discursive
analysis of their political actions and campaigns, in which the link between place and
activism is expressed and evident. According to Martin, the interpretative frames are
the tools of articulation of such important relationship (Martin, 2008). Going deeper
into the analysis, it emerges that locals are aware that their own territory can only be
the starting point of a fight that needs to be inscribed in a wider context, and must
necessarily refer to the national and supra-national frames of reference, if it aims to be
heard and to find solutions.
I want to show how, in Lampedusa, the island itself became significant to the local
activist to foster a sense of place and collectivity in order to promote their own
representations and views on immigration issues. As pro- and anti- immigrants
struggles develop in a particular place, framings oh who belongs and who doesn’t are
intimately linked to local interpretative schemes first, and national and supra-national
discourses second.
1. Methodology
Discourse Analysis
Before moving to the focus of my research, I want to provide the readers with few
more details concerning the methods and strategies I used to study these issues.
The main methodological technique I used is the Discourse analysis. I chose to
proceed this way with the conviction that the most effective way to understand the
mechanisms of construction of interpretative schemes and the creation of new
identities is the semantic analysis of the language and the practices enacted by the
actors. For the discursive analysis of the dominant interpretative scheme and for that
of the interpretative frames of resistance I used two different approaches.
In order to make sense of the dominant logic and way of thinking proper of State and
institutions, the most effective method was the analysis of two major Italian
newspapers, situated at the two ideological poles of the Italian political orientation. As
I will specify in the fifth section, mass media play a crucial role in the diffusion and
consolidation of ideas, concept and images. During the ‘emergency’ in Lampedusa, they
happened to cover a pivotal role in the constitution of two opposed groups, sharing
different visions of what was going on at the time. I reviewed all the articles and the
reports on immigration issues published by the two newspapers during that period of
time, and I selected the sentences and statements that could say something about the
way political narratives are constructed. The decision of not considering minor
newspapers or web-sites of information has the limit of ignoring those voices that
publicly criticized the affirmations and the actions of the government and institutions;
however, the newspapers I chose are representative of the ideas and way of thinking of
the groups of people at power at the time. Moreover, they are in the top ten of the most
read newspapers by Italians1, and thus they represent a good sample of what kind of
information circulated in the country in the period of my study.
The Fieldwork
I went to Lampedusa twice, the first in July of 2011 and the second in July of 2012. July
is a very good period of the year to observe the dynamics of social interactions taking
place among a heterogeneous group of people, formed by the islanders and the
tourists. For the Lampedusians, this is the best period to make business, since most are
employed in the tourism industry. The activists of the movement Askavusa as well,
chose this month to present the Lampedusa in Festival, a film festival focusing on
themes connected with Migration. Once I arrived on the island, I decided that the
Festival would have been the starting point of my research, a good occasion to meet
people and talk with them. My intuition revealed to be right: I volunteered for the
Festival both in 2011 and in 2012, and I had the chance to come in close contact with
the activists of Askavusa and with many people revolving around the Festival. One man
1
Analysis by Audipress Agency – 2011/02/03
and one woman, founders of Askavusa, were my primary informants. I conducted
semi-structured interviews with them and with five others activists, two of them born
and raised in Lampedusa and working with Askavusa since the beginning. The other
three informants were coming from other Italian regions, but would come every
summer in Lampedusa, on the occasion of the Film Festival organizaed by Askavusa, in
order to help the activists with their initiatives. They were quite close to the
Lampedusian activists and very much involved into the island’s dynamics. Their point
of view has been crucial to my research, proving that the Lampedusa struggle was not
felt only by Lampedusians, but was something involving a much wider group of people.
All my informants were aware of the reason of my presence in Lampedusa and the
objectives of my research. A bond based on reciprocal trust was immediately created,
and thanks to them I had the chance to have many insights of the life on the island. A
key methodological consideration when conducting an ethnographic research is the
degree of involvement of the researcher in the field. Soon after my arrival, I was
considered as being an active member of Askavusa. The fact of ‘belonging’ to the
community I was studying, certainly influenced my judgement; however, I managed to
keep the two works – the fieldwork and the organization of the festival – separated,
and to conduct interviews the more objective and neutral I could. I want to stress that
all those I interviewed during the organization of the Festival were completely aware
of the research I was conducting, and they accepted to participate in the role of
informants.
The “others” Lampedusians
Before moving on, I need to make a specification. My research focuses on a small group
of activists and the strategies they enact to counter the dominant interpretative frame.
However, Askavusa is not representative of the Lampedusians’s feelings at all. I want to
stress that, at the time of my research, the Lampedusians adhering to Askavusa’s
discourses were a minority on the island. That is why I decided to conduct a little
covert research with the people who were not part of the movement and who I could
not meet during the organization of the Festival, in order to have a wider picture of the
situation. I became friends with few families working in the tourism industry, and I
introduced myself as a regular tourist. This way, I managed to get some information on
their way of perceiving the migrants and the emergency on the island. What I found
very interesting was that most of these people were very suspicious of the activities of
Askavusa and, in some cases, they blamed the activists of supporting the invasion and
helping the migrants to stay on the island. Many of those people were very trusting of
what the government was doing, and were categorical in their condemnation of the
“foreign invasion”, while having a faith in the promises made by politicians for the
liberation of the island.
This research won’t take into consideration the dynamics of conflict among the
islanders, but I would encourage the study of the mechanisms of social interaction
among the members of a bounded community mainly characterized by strong ties, like
an island. It was striking to see how ‘the emergency’ influenced and, in some cases,
radically changed relationships traditionally founded on solidarity and trust.
4. The Case Study
Mapping the Place
Lampedusa is a small island in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea. It is part of the
Sicilian region and it is considered the southern boundary of Italy and, thus, of Europe.
Due to its natural landscape, its wonderful beaches and its almost tropical climate, it is
one of the most popular holiday destinations for tourists, both Italian and foreigners.
The population of Lampedusa – consisting of about 5000 inhabitants – has been
employed for centuries in the sponge and fishing industries. In the past few years, the
Lampedusians had to face an alarming crisis, due to the lack of ‘pesce azzurro’.
Nowadays, the majority of the fish consumed is imported on the island from countries
like Greece or Spain. Of course, this crisis has entailed a big change in the social and
economical texture of the island, having consequences also on the social relationships
between the islanders and on the seasonal rhythm of the activities. In the last forty
years, many decided to give up with their activities, encouraged by the public state and
incentives to end their businesses. Nowadays the fishing boats are mainly used for
showing around the tourists during the summer. The scarcity of resources has resulted
in the explosion of a war over the sea, between the Lampedusians fishermen and the
Tunisians. In fact, in the past few years the Tunisians started approaching the Italian
waters seeking fish. This has opened an arena of conflict with the two countries
accusing each other of stealing and using illegal means to fish and sell the fish.
Inevitably, when the ideological and political battle over the ‘immigrati invasion’
started, a lexical and conceptual connection between the ‘Arabs’, ‘immigrati’,
‘clandestini’ and the Tunisian fishermen was easily created. The word immigrati
labelled an indistinct group of people coming from the African continent, who would
undermine the Italian economy and the everyday life of Italians, by stealing their jobs
as they would do with their fish.
Since the 1980’s, the islanders have developed a strong economical dependency on
tourism that ended up structuring their whole life. During my fieldwork on the island I
had the chance to spend some time with a family of locals composed of five members
(mother, father, two daughters and one son). The story of the family D. – similar to
many other stories of the islanders – it is helpful to understand how strongly the
industry of tourism has become influent in the economic and social life of the islanders.
Gaetano D., the head of the family, is a former fisherman who ended his business back
in 1985. Since then, he got rid of his small fish boat and bought a new bigger one.
Today his main activity is to show around the tourists with his boat, the Adriana. The
tours are twice per day – one in the day-time and one night tour – and cost about 30-40
euros per person. He works only during the summer season, from the end of May until
the end of September. About five years ago, he also opened a small kiosk on the new
port, selling drinks and home-made food, mostly Sicilian specialities. The kiosk is also
open in the summer season and is run by his wife Enza and his daughter Maria. During
the year the family lives in a house next to the airport, while in the summer months
they move in a much smaller house next to the kiosk and they rent their own house to
the tourists. These three activities make the whole source of income of the family.
During these three months they work very hard, seven days per week and almost
twentyfour hours per day (the kiosk opens quite early in the morning and it closes
around 5am in the morning). During the rest of the year, the family moves to Mazara
del Vallo – a city on the Sicilian coast – where the three children go to school. They go
in their house in Lampedusa just once in a while, in the weekends or for the holidays.
This way of living is quite common for the Lampedusians people; almost all of them
entirely depend on tourists for their living.
This picture explains why the attention brought by media on the island since
1986 – when Lybia fired two scuds on Lampedusa in response to an US attack – had
complex effects on Lampedusa and its inhabitants. In fact, the media coverage pushed
many tourists who never heard about the island before to choose it as favourite
holiday destination. Despite this, when many journalists started reporting what was
going on with the people arriving in Lampedusa from Africa, crowded on scruffy boats
and then brought to reception centres, Lampedusians began being hostile to journalists
and reporters, accusing them of ‘making bad publicity’ to the island.
Few authors have written about Lampedusa; Friese (Friese, 2008) makes an
interesting analysis of how the concept of hospitality – historically rooted in the
Sicilian and Lampedusian culture – has changed over time. He is in line with Balibar
(Balibar, 2003), asserting that “On one hand, the transnational movement of people
weaken borders and sovereignity of the nation state, on the other hand boundaries are
currently being reaffirmed by new nationalisms and localisms that shape the concrete
forms of hospitality”. Considering the fact that Lampedusa, in recent years, became a
space of transit for migrants, he stresses the symbolic dimension of Lampedusa. The
island is a symbol in the sense that is a space open to a plurality of meanings.
Lampedusa is the southern border of Europe, the symbol of the decisions taken by the
UE committee in immigration issues, a window where the human tragedies connected
to the immigration flows are displayed. At the same time, Lampedusa represents the
junction that articulates the complex relationships between North and South, Centre
and Periphery, State and locality. Given these characteristics, the island has become an
arena within which political and ideological battles are fought day by day.
The legal context
In order to untie the complexity of this significant place, it is necessary to
understand the juridical and political framework within which this clash of meanings
takes place. The approach of the institutions to the ‘immigration issue’ has produced
what Friese calls ‘the borders regime’; in his view, the border regime is a political
system that “encompasses a highly complex organizational structure with various legal
references and different (local) actors that have various (corporate) traditions, and
values that respond to different demands and belong to different (supra)national
frames of reference that cross cut day-to-day action and routines.” (Friese, 2008: 17).
The author here is stressing the transversality of the system: the border regime is the
product of micro-geographies of spatial relations and meaning, where multiple scales
of social interaction intersect.
Let’s first take a look the national juridical context in matter of immigration:
since the enactment of the Turco Napolitano law in 1998 – that established the CPTA
(temporary stay and assistance centers) with the purpose of administrative detention
of third-country nationals pending expulsion from Italy – detention and expulsion of
undocumented migrants have become crucial pillars of Italy’s politics towards
irregular migration. This modus operandi was strengthened by the enactment of the
‘Bossi-Fini’ law, four year later. The law introduced a restriction to the entry of the
citizens of those countries that did not collaborate with Italian government and that
were not part of any agreement or partnership related to the control of immigration
flows. This way, the law recognized a substantial difference among the non-Italian
citizens, based on their geographical origin. Also, in order to obtain the permesso di
soggiorno (permit of stay), the migrants were now obliged to exhibit a contratto di
soggiorno (contract of stay), through which an employer should declare to guarantee
the migrant employee’ s accommodation. Moreover, the law made it more difficult for
immigrants to obtain papers, making the legalization of migrants on Italian territory
almost impossible. Expulsion from the country and deportation became the main
mechanisms in the so-called ‘fight against illegal immigration’ and, as a consequence,
the CPTA’s were turned into real detention centres. It’s clear the purely repressive
connotation of such a regulation - aiming to eliminate the migrants from the Italian
territory and to prevent the entry of the newcomer – while it does not say anything
about a reform of the social structures in order to make the territory suitable to
welcome new flows of people. Moreover, the fight against the black job market seems
to be quite a mystification, since it increases the contractual power of the employer,
who is entitled to define the working conditions of the employee. The paradoxical
result of a norm aimed to fight the illegal immigration is to feed the expansion of the
black job market and to increase the structural weakness of the migrant worker, who is
exposed to blackmailing and who is too vulnerable to raise his voice and to negotiate
for his own rights. Eventually, by enacting such procedures the state produces
illegality, while trying to combat it.
The EU has also played an important role in framing the regulation of migrants
in the country (Andrijasevic, 2006). The decisions taken at the supranational level has
shaped the modes of actions of the actors at the national and local level, by tracing a
political map of Europe, delimitating its boundaries and determining the criteria of
inclusion and exclusion of people from the imagined European community. The author
starts from the assumption that the externalization policies – through the means of
detention and expulsion of undocumented migrants - have become crucial pillars of
EU’s policies towards irregular migration. Next to the implementation of the
aforementioned legal apparatus, in 2008 the Italian government established a
partnership with Lybia, with the aim of fighting illegal migration and smuggling. The
agreement included, among other things, new criteria for readmission of migrants,
training for Libyan police officers and board guards and Italian-funded detention and
repatriation programmes for irregular migrants in Lybia. By increasing border controls
and by making the entry of foreigners in Europe more difficult, Andrijasevic suggests
that these policies have had the paradoxical effect of leading to the growth of illegals on
the European soil, and have contributed to the growth of human trafficking. Although
the Italian government has been the political subject proposing and supporting the
system regime, the procedures described in so far are inscribed in a wider political
pattern, called the ’externalisation strategy’, sponsored and funded by supranational
institutions such as the European Commission. The author defines externalisation as
‘the propensity of several EU member States to establish centres for processing asylum
applications outside the EU’s external borders’; in the case of the Italy-Lybia
agreement, the EU commission contributed with the allocation of 1,8 billions of euros
in a special fund dedicated to ‘external borders’. The relocation of the southern
European border in the Sahara desert should involve a constant monitoring on
rejection procedures that actually never happened. Andrijasevic notes that “the EU
went ahead to develop cooperation on irregular migration with Lybia, despite evidence
of human rights violations there, no guarantee of refugee rights and no official
recognition of UNHCR protection mandate” (Andrijasevic, 2006). This way, the EU
directives strengthened Member states’ discretion, leaving them room for the
application of exceptions and became co-responsible of the human abuses and
smuggling.
In this picture, Lampedusa has played a key role in the administration of
migration flows in Europe. Many actors have been involved in defining the identity of
Lampedusa as a controversial place where decisions taken at the national and
European level are displayed and become effective. Of course, this process has real
consequences not only on the migrants who reach the island, but also on the Italian
citizens who live on the island and face everyday the effects of the political battle
played at the national and supranational level. This became extremely evident in the
first months of 2011, after the so-called ‘Arabic spring’, when Lampedusa was
transformed into a theatre stage; as we shall see further on, a number of actors
(including national and international institutions, politicians, activists, NGOs, migrants
and islanders) got involved into a big political and sociological fight, with the aim of
conquering their share of space under the world spotlights and imposing their own
schemes of interpretation.
The emergency
Due to its position, Lampedusa has always been the first dock on the
immigration trajectories for migrants fleeing from Africa and heading to Europe. It’s
not easy to find official data; according to the Police, between 1998 and 2003 about
26.000 people arrived on the Lampedusian’s shores. From 2001 on, there’s been a big
increase, with a peak of about 37.000 migrants arriving in 2008 (about 31.000 of them
landing in Lampedusa). Since the establishment of the partnership agreement between
Italy and Lybia in 2008, the flow of people decreased 74%, with about 9.500 people
landing on the Italian shores. During 2010, the number of people arriving in Italy did
not increase, probably thanks to the harsh repatriation policies2. In December 2010,
the situation radically changed. After the so-called ‘Arab spring’, the “normal” landings,
the “usual emergencies” that Lampedusa had learnt to handle over the years, had a
huge increase. Hundreds of people started arriving everyday on the island crammed
into crumbling boats. Italians refer to the landings with the term sbarchi, with a
reference to the docking of the boats to the Lampedusa port. Again, the expression is
misleading since, as the municipalities of Lampedusa and Linosa affirmed in March
2011, “for the most part, it referred to rescues made at large distance in the sea,
between fifty and one hundred nautical miles outside the archipelago” (Il Corriere di
2
Data source: Manconi L, Anastasia S, (2012) Lampedusa non è un’isola, A buon diritto, Italy
Sicilia, 2010). They also added that this clarification, rather than having mere lexical
implications, profoundly affects the image of the island. The term sbarchi, in fact, has a
strong connection with an imaginary connected to aggression and invasion, far away
from the concept of rescue. While the rescues could have had a different destination like Malta or the Sicilian mainland - the government chose to merge all the migrants on
the island. Such decision was in line with the policies established by the partnership
agreement; the government decided to face the problem by intensifying the procedures
of identification and repatriation of migrants and to block the transfers to the
reception centres scattered throughout Italy. The structures that should have
functioned as first aid and reception centres were too small to host everybody. As a
consequence, the island became a big, open air, reception centre, since the structures
that should have functioned as first aid and reception centres were too small to host all
these people. In March 2011 there was an average of 4000 migrants present on the
island everyday who were forced to live side by side with the 5000 inhabitants with no
chance of leaving. The hygienic and living conditions in the two reception centres were
terrible, and those who did not find a place in the structures lived on the streets or in
the port. We shouldn’t forget that there is no hospital on the island and social services
and infrastructures are insufficient also for the Lampedusians inhabitants themselves.
The situation was unbearable. Many institutions, ONGs and journalists began
denouncing the inhumane conditions that people were facing in Lampedusa. On
February 18th, 2011 the government proclaimed a “state of emergency”, and the
Minister of the Interior Roberto Maroni announced that economic and structural
measures would be adopted to solve the situation and compensate the Lampedusians
for the inconveniences. The plan to counter the ‘emergenza clandestini’ – as the
government referred to it – did not work as the government had hoped. The people
arriving on the island were almost as twice as many those transferred to the reception
centres. Many people protested against the violations that the plan entailed, such as
the choice of sending of a large number of migrants to Refugee Centres that should
have been used as first care and help centres and which, instead, were named Centri di
Identificazione ed Espulsione (Identification and Expulsion Centres), in practice,
detention centres. The government felt entitled to violate the existing laws in matter oh
human rights and immigration by appealing to the exceptional status of emergency
that the territory was now living. They compared the situation to events such as the
earthquake in Abruzzo in 2006, an exceptional occasion that demanded fast solutions
and actions even at cost of the legality of such actions. The representatives of the
institutions did everything in their power to emphasize the excepionality of the
moment, stressing the dangers that Italy was about to face and using the rhetoric of
invasion, that I will analyse more in depth later on. The Italian government was facing
hard times: the turbulences and discontents between those regions that accepted to
welcome the migrants in their cities and those who followed the line of ‘Not In My
Backyards’ were out of control. When the Minister of Foreign Affairs appealed to the
EU members to take on their responsibilities, the replies were also conflicting and
often negative. The most evident case was that of France. Since the most of the people
arrived in the early months of 2011 were Tunisians heading to France, Italy decided to
grant them a temporary visa that would permit them to circulate around the Schengen
Area. France claimed its unwillingness to host the migrants and expressed its feelings
by closing the border with Italy. For several weeks hundreds of migrants were blocked
in Ventimiglia, at the border. The tension increasingly grew when the migrants,
supported by left-wing activists, had to confront representatives of the extreme rights
and of Lega Nord. Despite the contrasts, they all agreed in invoking the EU committee
and the EU members to take on their own responsibilities and to respect the EU laws in
matter of immigration and human rights. Finally, France accepted to open the borders
and to host the Tunisians. With the deposition of Muhammar Gheddafi, the situation
became more complicated: for a few months, Italy found itself trapped in a double-face
role. Historically friend of the Lybian government, the Italian government hesitated
until the last moment to side with the rebels and the other EU countries. Premier
Berlusconi wavered and contradicted himself for a while but in the end, he was forced
to publicly condemn his old friend and guarantee full support to the Lybians fleeing
from war. Since then, the situation in Lampedusa slowly got back to normal, even if the
arrivals of migrants on the island were still frequent, the reception centres were in
terrible conditions and the transfers to other reception centres in Italy were still
inadequate. The emergency plan was due to end on December 31st 2012. After that
time, all the migrants who were guaranteed legal protection and hospitality will be out
of the programmes, many of them with no documents, no jobs and no place to go. The
programme seems to have failed and, even if since then the administration has
changed, politicians, institutions and the civic society still have to deal with the issue
that changed the face of Italy in the last two years.
The Border Show: Lampedusa
As we have seen, in the period of time described, Lampedusa has become the
centre of a huge mechanism involving two continents. The island has embodied in
everybody’s imaginary the concept of boundary, the quintessence of the border. Italian
scholar Mazzoleni argues that: ”the equation between politics and theatre, that is the
dramatic nature of politics […] is part of history of politics”, but it particularly emerges
nowadays, characterized by a high level of “spectacle of political communication”
(Mazzoleni, 1998). Guy Debord stresses the affirmation of the ‘spectacular domain’ in
what he defines “the society of the spectacle, meaning the “social relationship between
individuals” (Debord, 1971). According to the philosopher, such society is capable of
manipulation and, thus, of construction of history. Edelman argues that action and
language of politics are able to feed processes of symbolic construction of reality and
consensus. He defines politics as “a show, told by media and testified by a part of the
audience” (Edelman, 1985). Therefore, if politics is a show, the border is particularly
suited to serve as a stage. Italian scholar Nicholas De Genova has shown how the
border between U.S. and Mexico is the ideal theatre for the spectacle of illegal migrants.
The “border show” he describes, has as main characters the Mexicans people who are
considered, in the U.S. , the illegal migrants by definition (so as the Mexican border is
considered the border by definition) (De Genova, 2008). Also in the Italian literature
on borders and boundaries, the metaphor of the show is quite common. Federica Sossi
speaks of “the staging of the defence of the borders” and of “politics that make
spectacular borders built ad hoc”. She describes Lampedusa as “the frontier for
excellence”, transformed in stage for the show of control policies (Sossi, 2006). In this
picture, the idea of ‘emergency’ - and the imaginary connected to it – becomes a
powerful tools in the hands of politicians and media, to impose an interpretation that
sees migrants as a threat and migration as a danger. In this research, ‘the emergency’
will be the background on the scene, as well as the semantic core of the dominant
discourse.
5. Dominant Interpretative Frame: “Immigrati are a threat”
History teaches us that Italians have emigrated from their homeland for
centuries, in search of better jobs and to live a better life until when, in the 1970s, Italy
started importing foreign workforce. Accustomed to being foreigners abroad, the
Italians proved to be very welcoming to the newcomers, so to gain the appellation of
‘brava gente’ (good people) Things changed when, in 1989, mass media reported the
slaughter of a South-African refugee: it was the first time that an issue about a
foreigner came to the public attention. Immediately, the hottest topics discussed in the
public arena became ‘racism’ and ‘foreign invasion’ (Rivera et. al., 2009). Mass media,
rather than being neutral, created the reality by organizing and selecting news and
information. Since the 1990s, immigrants in Italy have been labelled as vucumprà,
imitating the pronunciation of African immigrants of ‘vuoi comprare?’, meaning in
Italian ‘do you want to buy?’. The term has, of course, a strongly racist connotation and
it refers to the main modality if immigration of non-European citizens to Italy,
connected to seasonal work; after the approval of the Treaty of Schengen, the
newspapers started speaking of extracomunitari (people coming from outside the
European Union), stressing the fact that the most of the them did not belong to the
European Community. After the institutions of the immigration policies I described, the
language adopted in the public arena reflected an institutional view of the migrants,
with a reference to his being irregular; the most used term on TV and newspapers to
talk about migrants was, and still is clandestini (clandestines). As Annamaria Rivera
suggests (Rivera et. al., 2009), this is a lexical category created in recent times,
semantically connected to the dimension of secrecy, of hidden and illicit. In the
everyday language, the term indicates an ambivalence of illegality, in the modalities of
the arrival in Italy on the one hand, and in the production of illicit activities on the
Italian territory on the other; moreover, the expression indicates a definitive and
essential status, a permanent and irreversible condition. Furthermore, the more
general category of immigrato, is also misleading, since it totally excludes the
individual processes of identification of the migrant and is not historically defined. This
discursive framing of migrants shapes the social representation of the immigrants on
the most visible and weakest people – those who have no documents, who do not carry
the positive values of a good citizen – thus excluding those who do not have such
characteristics and generating stereotypes. This is to say that mass media have a great
role in the production of those ‘effects of reality’ theorized by Roland Barthes (Barthes,
1968) within which individuals think and act. Such effects reproduce the values and
laws imposed by the institutions and, as a consequence, they end up defining the
boundaries between regular and irregular, citizen and foreigner, legal and illegal. In
the next section, I will show how the process of construction of interpretative frames
happens, and how it is reproduced day by day and becomes dominant.
The Myth of Invasion
I analysed articles and reports of two major Italian newspapers, La Repubblica
(traditionally close to the left-wing and to progressives) and Il Giornale (property of
Silvio Berlusconi, at the time prime minister of Italy, and traditionally the voice of
conservatives and right-wing), published during ‘the emergency’ period, between
December 2010 and December 2012. Since the declaration of the State of emergency,
there emerged a vision of immigrants as needy and unfortunates. In an open letter
from Silvio Berlusconi to the Cardinal Secretary of the State Tarcisio Bertoni, he
stresses “the Italian generosity” and “the commitment of Italy to those who suffer” (La
Repubblica, 2011/13/04). The newspaper always refers to the boats on which
migrants land on Italian shores as “carrette di mare” (dilapidated boats), while the
descriptions of the landings and the life of migrants on the island refers to a dimension
of desperation and poverty, picturing the people at the port as “a mass of individuals
needy of the most basic assistance” (La Repubblica, 2011/22/02). “They are just poveri
cristi (Italian expression, which literally means Poor Christs, belonging to a Christian
semantic universe and at related to the Christian concept of Charity), they flee from a
world with no freedom, democracy and welfare. This is exactly what they expect from
us”, said Berlusconi (Il Giornale, 2011/03/30). Through the pen of its columnist
Cristiano Gatti, Il Giornale presents a harsher picture of the situation on the island: “We
must save Italians in Lampedusa. A barge filthy and unclean, slowly drifting away. A
huge shipwreck on land. Migrants from all countries and who came to Italy pushed by
any kind of reasons, sometimes doubtful reasons, camp out in the wild in all the areas
of the island. This is not reception anymore, it is just a crime.” (Il Giornale,
2011/03/25). The newspaper does not hesitate to picture migrants as a threat for all
the Italians and a danger for the Lampedusians. The journalist even doubts the reasons
that brought these people to Italy. The message is that these people don’t have right to
be on the Italian territory, and the implication is that, if the government won’t take
stringent measure, security and wellness of Italians will be at stake.
Soon enough, the general attitude of politicians to face the problem is made
clear: “We must push immigrati back, but we can’t shoot them, not yet”, claimed
Roberto Castelli, Minister of Infrastructures (La Repubblica, 2011/04/13). In their
view, deportation is the only solution. In June, Berlusconi proudly announces: “we
(himself and Roberto Maroni, Minister of Internal Affairs) approved a decree in matter
of immigration that will allow us to proceed with the forced expulsion of clandestines
and of the EU citizens who commit violations” (La Repubblica, 2011/06/16). Umberto
Bossi, leader of the populist party Lega Nord is even more categorical: “Immigrati?
Föra da i ball”, he claims, using a dialectic expression, which literally means “get the
fuck out”. This way, the institutions made explicit their refusal to host migrants and to
give them assistance. To the proposal of opening new reception centers in the North of
Italy, Lega Nord replies: “It is better to keep them next to their homeland” (La
Repubblica, 2011/06/29).
In the public statements of the leaders of political parties and representatives of
institutions, it is frequent the appeal to Europe to take its own responsibility in order
to raise Italy from a similar burden. “Immigration is a European problem, the crossborder European regions can not be left alone”, asserts Franco Frattini, Minister of
Foreign Affairs. Maurizio Gasparri, President of Senators of PDL adds that: “It emerges
the shameful inaction of EU, that rather than providing Italy with means and resources,
it proves to be the usual ghost” (La Repubblica, 2009/08/29). It is evident the
willingness of politicians to draw a clear line of distinction between those who deserve
help and assistance – the Italians, victims of ‘the emergency’ -, and those who do not the migrants, the foreign invaders who unlawfully threaten to destabilize our society.
The main imaginary of reference, and the narrative with the greatest impact is
constructed on the idea of the foreign invasion. Il Giornale stresses this concept
everyday, declining it in all the possible forms. These are few examples of the
newspaper’s headlines: “Foreign invasion even in the middle school” (Il Giornale,
2009/08/25); “Now stop the Islamic invasion!” (Il Giornale, 2012/03/26) and, even
the quite meaningful “Rise up against Europe to avoid an invasion!” (Il Giornale,
2011/04/11). This last imperative slogan, mixing anti-European and anti-immigarnts
sentiment, shows well the process of identification enacted by these politicians. The
line between friends and enemy is clearly drawn: on one side there are the Italian
citizens, represented by Italian institutions, while on the other there are all the
migrants, those who support them and those, like the EU institutions, who do nothing
to support the Italians. A report published in March was entitled: “How much do
clandestine cost us?”(Il Giornale, 2011/03/27). Migrants are depicted as an indistinct
mass, identified with the Muslims, who would come to Italy to threaten not only our
security and economic stability, but also our children and our religion.
It is interesting to note that, while La Repubblica mainly refer to migrants as
migranti or immigrati, Il Giornale uses for the most time the term clandestini
(clandestines), stressing their illegality and unlawfulness.
Lastly, what emerges from the analysis is the attempt of politicians of exhorting
Lampedusians to take their part, making frequent appeal to their being “the first
victims of the invasion” (Il Giornale, 2011/06/21). The most emblematic symbol of this
strategy, is the declaration of Berlusconi in May 2011 of his decision to buy a summer
residence in Lampedusa. “I’m going to be a Lampeduisian like you”, he claimed during
the public announcement on the island. Few days later, he announced that Lampedusa
would have been freed by migrants, and “inhabited only by Lampedusians”. He also
promised the islanders that he would nominate the island for the Nobel Peace Prize
and that he would build a casino, in order to “boost tourism” (La Repubblica,
2011/03/30). With this declarations, politicians give precise indications and
guidelines about who are the people rightfully belonging to Italy and those who are
not. While Italians and Lampedusians are entitled to have national and international
protection, and to the preservation of their own rights, migrants are conceived as
outcasts, as a threat to the Italian territorial, economic and cultural integrity, and must
be sent back. Lampedusa is pictured as a closed place, with strong boundaries and
severe criteria of inclusion and exclusion.
6. Interpretative Frame of Resistance: “We”, the Civic society
For the analysis of the collective-action frames created by Askavusa, I examined
the language and practices enacted by the activists in the construction of a coherent
scheme of interpretation. Following the example of Martin, I used the conceptual
heuristic proposed by Snow and Benford (Snow and Benford, 1998, 1992) that
intersects the three functions aforementioned: the motivational, diagnostic and
prognostic elements frames. Together, these three elements articulate and define the
community that act together, the problems they identify and the solutions they
propose.
Motivation Frames
According to Martin (Martin, 2008:p.736), Motivation frames describe the
community that act collectively, indicating those actors who take part to the actions
and who recognize themselves as being part of the group. These types of frames also
give indications about the criteria of inclusion into the imagined community. In this
regard, it’s interesting to give a look to the organizational structure of Askavusa.
According to G., one of the founders, Askavusa was born as a spontaneous reaction of
few young Lampedusians to the management of the migrants arriving on the island by
the central State. After few months, the activists formally constituted themselves as a
cultural association, in order to be able to open a bank account and to act as a legal
social entity. This solution entailed their adherence to several norms, such as the
election of a president and the institution of membership criteria. In 2012, G. and the
other members decided to dissolve the association, and to constitute themselves as a
movement. This allowed them to structure the group “horizontally”, without the
necessity of naming a president and registering the members. Askavusa is now a
movement open to everyone willing to give a contribution and participate to the
assemblies and actions. Such decision entails that everyone can define himself as an
Askavusa members. Such structural change is strongly connected with the political
essence of Lampedusa, since it defines Askavusa as a community without borders,
extremely inclusive rather than exclusive. G. told me that the goal of this decision was
to show that “another system is possible”. This way, Askavusa structurally positions
itself in strong opposition with the central state and institutions, characterized by a
hierarchical structure and representing what G. calls “an hypocritical majority”, that
only serves to exclude certain groups of people.
The first Motivation frame I identified is aimed at the formation of a new
collective identity, by calling the citizens of Lampedusa who don’t share the dominant
ideas on migration to cluster and start fighting. In the documents I analysed, many
times the activists of Askavusa invite people to “raise their own voices” and to “not be
accomplices” of the illegal measures in matters of immigration taken by the State3. The
imaginary recipients here are all those people who don’t feel included into the
dominant interpretative frame. Specifically, the activists characterize the community of
protesters as supporters of “legality” against the illegal practices enacted by the
government. The intention of the activists seem to be fostering a new sense of “We”,
the construction of a community sharing concern for “legality, wellness, landscape,
nature, political participation”, against those who “have as a priority the exploitation of
3
Source: www.askavusa.blogspot.it; July 2010
territory and the intellectual and economic corruption”4, determined by values that
have nothing to do with citizenship, race or geographical provenience. In defining the
characteristic of the group, the activists of Askavusa clearly mark a new line of
distinction between the local community and the State, that they picture as
representing illegality and inhumanity. In doing so, they position themselves in strong
opposition with the dominant discourse, that sees State and institutions as the
representatives of legality and security. This new way of framing the identity of the
movement, presents the activists and the immigrants as sharing the same concerns and
problems, such as the limitation to the freedom of movement, the freedom of finding a
job, the freedom of setting up a family and the fight for the preservation of all the
fundamental human rights. The discursive rhetoric is centred on the prevision of
catastrophic future: if we won’t fight for a change, we will need to emigrate as well, and
we will face the same problems the immigrants are facing right now. This new “We”
can include many different voices. Several times, the activists refer to themselves as
“we, the Lampedusians, the Italians, the Europeans”5.
The relationship between people and place is not always explicitly addressed by
the frames, but is the clearly the common thread of the discourse. The activists
mention the double side of Lampedusa, being the “main door of entrance to Europe” on
the one hand, and the place symbol of “detention, deprivation of fundamental rights,
deportation” 6on the other. The frame refers to a glorious past of the island, that
doesn’t exist anymore. Lampedusa has been transformed into “a militarized fortress,
where also its inhabitants suffer the forced isolation, lacking many essential services, a
5
www.askavusa.blogspot.it; June 2010
www.askavusa.blogspot.it; May 2011
6
Flyer for a demonstration in Lampedusa; April 2009 (See appendix 1)
4
decent health care system, efficient transportation”7. Here the broad “We” described in
first place is narrowed down, to address the Lampedusa inhabitants, those who
suffered on their own skins the decisions made by the central state. The frame appeals
to the sense of belonging of those Lampedusians who “were there”, in opposition to
those who weren’t. Again, the activists try to awaken the sense of responsibility of all
those people who share a different perception of the migrants’ arrival on the island and
to those who feel to be exploited and deceived by the State and who feel they are not
owners of their territory anymore. By stressing the similarities between their
problems and those of the migrants, the activists of Askavusa create a new sense of
identity that have nothing to do with national citizenship, but is still strongly
connected with the territory of Lampedusa.
Diagnostic Frames
Framing diagnostically means to individuate problems and to assign blames and
causes (Martin, 2008: 739). As we have seen, the main regret of Askavusa is the
destruction of the perception of Lampedusa as a natural paradise and a welcoming
place by the laws of the last years. What Lampedusa has become is a place dominated
by corruption and by “the logic of the biggest bank account”8. Responsible of such
transformation are those who only look at the profit, sponsoring a non-sustainable
tourism on the island and throwing away the migrants who could harm their business.
They add that such operation is inscribed into a wider project of “inhuman policies”
aimed at the construction of the “fortress Europe” and at the militarization of the
island9. The link between the mobilization and the place is self-evident here: the frame
Flyer for a demonstration in Lampedusa; April 2009 (See appendix 1)
Source: www.askavusa.blogspot.it; June 2011
9 Source: www.askavusa.blogspot.it; August 2011
7
8
addresses all those who share these problems as well as the need to raise their own
voice and to take back possess of their own territory.
According to Martin, Diagnostic frames should also describe how the place
should be, individuating the elements that are out of place, and the problems that must
be solved (Martin, 2008: 739). The activists explicitly aim to restore the imaginary of
Lampedusa as “ a community capable of giving hope”. They strongly oppose to the
transformation of the island in “the European Guantanamo” and in the establishment
on the island of a prison for immigrants”10. As an alternative, Lampedusa needs to
reaffirm its image of “a place of extraordinary beauty and inhabited by civic and
welcoming people, who still believe in the values of democracy and solidarity”. They
want to make the island “a beacon of solidarity and justice”, a clean place with essential
services for the auto-sufficiency of its people and of their hosts11.
The diagnosis of the problems proposed by Askavusa, mentions also another
important aspect that needs to be fought and changed. In their view, the perception
Italians have of migrants is strongly racist and xenophobic and, in the best cases,
connected to the ideas of charity and excess of welfarism. “Italians see migrants as
those who steal their jobs or, at best, as charity works useful to go to Heaven”, told me
E., a woman working with Askavusa. “The first step to make real changes, is to change
the mind of people”, says L., a man I met working for the Lampedusa in Festival. He
adds that “we must make the people understand we need to fight together with
migrants, for the rights that have been taken from us”. This position is made explicit in
the public announcement of the forthcoming edition of Lampedusa in Festival, that will
take place in July 2013, in which Askavusa invites “everybody to contribute with their
works to a reflection on the forms of representation migratory dynamics in the
10
11
Source: www.askavusa.blogspot.it; March 2009
Source: www.askavusa.blogspot.it; March 2009
receiving societies: how they are portrayed, perceived, through what kind of rhetoric
constructions the public image of migratory flows is constructed and how all this is in
relation with their effective and concrete reality”12.
As we shall see in the analysis of the Prognostic Frames, the solution proposed
by Askavusa are addressed towards several different actors. Such frames assign the
blames for the present situation to all those who followed the logic of money in first
place; then they address the Italian State and Institutions, the corrupted politicians
and, finally, the European Union as the actuators of the project that will lead to the ruin
of the island, of its inhabitants and of the migrants. We can notice that the Diagnostic
Frames constructed by the activists not only individuate the local problems, but also
inscribe them into a broader context, moving the scale of the Lampedusians’ problems
beyond the island’s boundaries, to the national and supra-national scale. The message
they try to convey is that the problems of the islanders involve migrants, Italians and
all Europeans citizens.
Prognostic Frames
Prognostic Frames identify the actions taken by the collective organizations and
the solutions they propose to solve the problems they have identified (Martin, 2008:
742).
Interestingly, the activists appeal to entities situated at different geographical
scales for the solution of the problems. In order to rehabilitate the image of
Lampedusa, Askavusa appeals to the necessity of constructing an alternative
conception of tourism, based on sustainability, love of nature and cultural offer. This
idea is well expressed in the campaign launched by Askavusa in 2010, “Io vado a
12
Bando quinta edizione Lampedusainfestival (See appendix 2)
Lampedusa” (I go to Lampedusa). With the approaching of the warm season, the
activists organized small events all over Italy, selling t-shirts with the campaign’s logo
(picture) and spreading the official manifesto. The manifesto is written in first person,
with each paragraph starting with “I go to Lampedusa because…”13. The reasons why a
tourist should choose the island as holiday destination, according to Askavusa, all
relate to the main battle fought by the organization. The campaign makes appeal to the
sense of solidarity of people with the Lampedusians and with the migrants who have
been deprived of their own rights. It invites the “alternative tourists” to recognise with
their problems, and to help them by supporting the local economy, in a sustainable
way. Again, the organization appeals to the creation of a broad sense of “We”, to a new
shared identity that can be the trigger of the change, by calling on responsibility all
nationals for the solution of local problems.
Beside what “we”, the citizens and the civic society can do, Askavusa sets the
political and juridical issues related to migration into the national and supra-national
institutional context. They demand to the regional and national administration to
“restore the rescue and reception system already experimented in 2006 with the
opening of the Reception Center of Contrada Imbriacola, that was considered a model
by the whole Europe”14. They often mention national examples of town-councils that
successfully applied alternative and progressive models of reception of migrants. More
specifically, they demand the mayor of Lampedusa to allow Askavusa and other NGO’s
to have access to the detention centres, and to activate social services of information
and integration for the detained people.
The activists take a step further: it is clear that they fully understand the causal
process that lead to the present situation when they appeal to the European
13
14
Campaign “Io vado a Lampedusa”. (See appendix 3)
Source: www.askavusa.blogspot.it; July 2011
institutions for the political resolution of the issue that is interesting not only
Lampedusa, but the whole Europe. They explicitly ask Europe “not to keep on staying
silent, since silence can easily turn into complicity”. They ask European institutions to
operate “structural changes”, in order to relieve Italy of the burden. “The only solution”
– they write – “is the opening of a humanitarian corridor”, to organize the transfer and
evacuation of migrants towards the other Member-State’s territories15.
Lastly, Askavusa appeals for the recognition of the Fundamental human rights
for everybody, by demanding the abolition of the Detention centres, the establishment
of a new legal apparatus in Immigration matters, the institution of a direct
communication channel between European civic societies and North-African societies
to foster cooperation and mutual understanding.
The prognostic discourse made by the organization stands on different levels. It
begins with the involvement of the civic society and it ends with the appeal to the
consciousness of state and institutions, expressing explicitly the impotence of citizens
when it comes to the operationalization of these proposals. The themes are those that
resonate throughout all the phases of the collective-action frames: the rehabilitation of
the image of Lampedusa and the defence of the fundamental human rights for
everybody.
7. Conclusion
This research expands social movements theories and it gives a better
understanding of how interpretative frames of collective actions are constructed
discursively, through the construction of new geographical scales. It examines the
15
Source: www.askavusa.blogspot.it; May 2011
strategies enacted by a community of people operating in a small and bounded location,
aimed to the inscription of local issues into a wider national and supra-national context.
In order to respond to the dominant interpretative scheme, that sees immigrants as
outcasts and structurally separated – if not opposed – to the Italian citizens, the activists
use their territorial political identity to foster concern and sense of community at the
national and supra-national scales. The heuristic proposed by Snow and Benford and used
by Martin, helps to get a better understanding of the mechanisms of construction of the
frames of resistance. Through the collective-action framing, the activists of Askavusa
individuate blames and problems at the local level, while situating solutions and fostering
action within the Nation-State and the European Union.
From my findings result that the main strategy enacted by State and institution, and
reproduced by media, lies in the discursive construction of a narrative revolving around
the idea of foreign invasion, and in the fostering of a sense of fear into the population who
deserves rights. In the dominant interpretation, the role of place-frames is pivotal, since it
appeals the Italians and the Lampedusians to recognize themselves as belonging to a
bounded and closed group, that of Italians, clearly separated from the foreigners. By
presenting Lampedusians as the victims, politicians exhort them to align with the
dominant interpretation against the invaders.
Also for the activists of Askavusa, place-identity plays a crucial role in the construction
of an alternative scheme of interpretation. The main focus of their action is the fostering
of a new sense of “We”, a new identity with weak boundaries, open to all those who feel
like sharing concern for structural problems that involve citizens of all countries. The
activists appeal to the defence and preservation of the most fundamental human rights
that have been put at stake by the policies on matter of immigration. The island of
Lampedusa has a strongly symbolic role in this picture: it is the symbol of the deprivation
of freedom and human rights and, at the same time, it represent the possibility of the
formation of a new identity and the beginning of a battle for the re-conquest of the rights
denied. Through the restoration of the image of Lampedusa, the outcasts from all over the
world have the chance to restore their dignity and their right of existence at the global
level. Interestingly, the opponent groups use the same strategies based on place-framing,
but they result in the formation of two very different senses of identities, characterized by
different degrees of openness and criteria of access.
The Lampedusian case is strategic because of uniqueness. Since the beginning of
immigration flows towards Italy, the island and what was happening on it has been
represented and interpreted in different ways by different actors. This research sheds
light on the social dynamics of discoursive interaction between actors situated at different
scales. It shows how locality, nationality, and universality intermingle and end up defining
new categories and drawing new boundaries. In the present times - when migration and
movements of people seem to become more and more the spinal column of societies – an
analysis of the modalities of formation of social movements and of new alliances and
enmities seem to be quite important. The case I presented here suggests that in the near
future localities and communities will have an important weight in the geo-political
balances. Druing my fieldwork in Lampedusa, I had the chance to observe other the
interactions within the islanders and between them and the migrants themselves. That
was not the focus of my research, but I suspect that a deeper analysis of the internal
processes of construction and destruction of social ties and of the conflicts arising from it
might be fundamental to better understand the complexity of social movements for
immigrants’ rights. There are still many questions I have not been able to respond, for
these reasons I strongly encourage the development of further studies on the organization
and formation of political and social movements at the community level. We must start
taking into account the capability of small groups of appealing to a wide audience of
people and of triggering change. In a globalized society like ours, the discourses and
practices enacted by small realities should not be ignored.
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Appendix 1
Flyer for a demonstration in Lampedusa (April 2009)
Appendix 2
Announcement of the fifth edition of Lampedusa in Festival
Lampedusa In Festival - V Edizione
L’associazione
culturale Askavusa
“L’incontro con l’Altro” / Festival delle migrazioni e del recupero della storia orale
Un concorso per filmmakers a Lampedusa dal 19 al 23 luglio 2013
presenta
BANDO DI CONCORSO
1. OBIETTIVI
Gli obiettivi principali della manifestazione sono di aprire discussioni e riflessioni sulle migrazioni.
La promozione dei valori dell'accoglienza e dell'incontro, della diversità e del dialogo sono la spina
dorsale del Lampedusa In Festival, insieme ad una critica sulle cause che spingono migliaia di
persone a lasciare la propria terra.
Oggi il cinema è uno degli strumenti più efficaci e di maggiore impatto per la diffusione della
cultura a tutti i livelli e può essere uno strumento utile per far conoscere la società e per cambiarla,
per mantenere viva la memoria, per raccontare storie attraverso le quali analizzare, decodificare e
comprendere fenomeni globali.
Il dialogo attraverso il cinema, la musica, l'arte è il metodo che abbiamo scelto per indagare la
realtà complessa di cui facciamo parte.
2. CONCORSO
È prevista una sezione di concorso, illustrata di seguito, dal titolo:
Migrare: Le ragioni di una “scelta”
Il Lampedusa In Festival di quest'anno vuole aprire una riflessone critica sulle molteplici ragioni
che spingono migliaia di esseri umani a lasciare il proprio paese. Quali sono, nei paesi
dell'autodefinito “Occidente”, le percezioni comuni e diffuse delle condizioni di vita, delle culture,
delle situazioni politiche dei paesi di provenienza dei flussi migratori? L'obiettivo ambizioso è quello
di tematizzare lo scarto tra lo sguardo e il punto di vista delle società che ricevono i flussi migratori
e quelle di provenienza. Ciò permetterebbe anche di far emergere un vissuto spesso occultato
dalla cronaca “ufficiale”: quello di moltissimi che anche nei cosiddetti “paesi ricchi” costituiscono un
esercito in migrazione all'interno della crisi del capitale globale. L'apertura al vissuto
intersoggettivo della dislocazione e dello sradicamento permette di gettare luce sulle contraddizioni
interne alle società cosiddette ricche e benestanti, mostrando le esclusioni sociali e le subalternità
- tra le quali quella dei migranti - su cui si fondano.
Molteplici ragioni economiche, politiche, culturali, personali, sono all'origine della scelta di
“migrare”. Si può fuggire da una guerra, da un arruolamento obbligatorio o dalla devastazione del
proprio territorio da parte di una multinazionale; in migliaia possono scegliere di abbandonare la
propria società per sottrarsi alla destabilizzazione del proprio paese da parte di interessi
imperialistici e neocoloniali, che rendono povere e non autonome società potenzialmente in grado
di non esserlo; si può andare in cerca di un lavoro; si può voler raggiungere la propria compagna o
il proprio compagno; ci si può spostare per la curiosità di visitare altri posti o per qualsiasi altro
motivo legato a sogni e bisogni che ogni singolo individuo dovrebbe sentirsi libero di avere.
Il Festival invita tutti coloro che vorranno contribuire con le proprie opere a una riflessione sulle
forme di rappresentazione delle dinamiche migratorie egemoni nelle società di arrivo dei migranti:
come questi ultimi tendono ad essere visti, percepiti, attraverso quali costruzioni retoriche viene
prodotta l'immagine pubblica delle migrazioni e come tutto ciò sia in relazione con la loro effettiva e
concreta realtà. Conclusosi il "viaggio", le ragioni che l'hanno fatto nascere si scontrano poi spesso
con le condizioni di vita, di lavoro, di sfruttamento, di esclusione e di subalternità sociale dei
migranti che riescono in qualche modo ad arrivare e a restare. Approfondire le geografie di potere
di tali dinamiche è qualcosa che il cinema può riuscire a fare grazie alla potenza della sua forma
espressiva.
3. PREMI
Vincitori del concorso per la sezione “Migrare: Le ragioni di una scelta”
1° premio: € 650,00
2° premio: € 350,00
4. REGOLE DI PARTECIPAZIONE
L’iscrizione al Festival è gratuita. La partecipazione è aperta ad autori italiani e stranieri.
Si accettano filmati solamente su supporto DVD. Non si accettano altri supporti.
Gli autori devono compilare la scheda con l’avvertenza di scrivere in modo leggibile nome e
cognome, indirizzo, città, telefono e dovranno firmare il consenso al trattamento dei dati personali.
Importante! Non sarà accettata la presentazione di più film su un solo supporto DVD.
4a. Modalità di invio dei lavori in concorso
Sono ammessi al concorso tutti i cortometraggi (fiction, videoclip o documentari) della durata
massima di 45 minuti, titoli inclusi.
È necessario inviare i lavori insieme alla scheda di partecipazione e al modulo per il trattamento
dei dati personali per lettera/pacco postale o per corriere, entro e non oltre il 10 giugno 2013 a:
LampedusaInFestival c/o Associazione ASKAVUSA, presso Giacomo Sferlazzo
Via Cala Pisana, 66 - 92010 Lampedusa (AG)
È consigliato (ma facoltativo) l'invio dei lavori anche via posta elettronica tramite WeTransfer
(http://www.wetransfer.com) all’indirizzo email [email protected]. I formati accettati
in questo caso sono: mov, mpg2, mpg4, avi dv (si sconsiglia l'utilizzo di altri codec avi per evitare
errori di lettura). Il limite per ogni file è di 2 gigabyte.
Scheda di partecipazione e modulo di consenso al trattamento dei dati personali sono disponibili
online sul sito ufficiale dell’evento: http://www.lampedusainfestival.com.
Ogni autore potrà inviare una sola opera per sezione di concorso. Sono ammesse solo le
produzioni successive al 1 gennaio 2010. Le spese di spedizione sono a carico dell’autore.
Si richiede la gentilezza di sottotitolare le opere in lingua inglese, vista la propensione del Festival
alla creazione di circuiti internazionali, gemellaggi e/o proiezioni all’estero. I filmati non italiani
dovranno avere i sottotitoli in italiano oppure in inglese o francese.
Si richiede la gentilezza di inviare una foto di scena con una definizione di 300 dpi via email
all’indirizzo: [email protected].
Non verranno accettati filmati consegnati la sera della proiezione.
I filmati selezionati non saranno restituiti e rimarranno presso l’archivio del Festival. Gli autori
autorizzano il Lampedusa In Festival alla proiezione delle proprie opere per motivi promozionali o
di studio, senza fini di lucro, che si possono svolgere in momenti diversi dall’evento stesso.
La selezione delle opere che verranno ammesse in concorso avviene a cura e a giudizio
insindacabile della direzione artistica del Festival. Al termine della preselezione, gli autori saranno
informati telefonicamente o via email. Le opere e i nomi degli autori selezionati verranno inoltre
pubblicati sul sito ufficiale dell’evento.
La manifestazione è sviluppata in collaborazione con:
Re.Co.Sol. - Rete dei comuni solidali
ASGI - Associazione per gli studi giuridici sull’immigrazione
AMM - Archivio delle memorie migranti
Legambiente Onlus
BSA - Brigata di solidarietà attiva
eGlob web agency
Associazione culturale Archivio Storico Lampedusa
Rete del Caffè Sospeso - Rete di festival, rassegne e associazioni culturali in mutuo soccorso
Il Lampedusa In Festival ha il patrocinio del Comune di Lampedusa e Linosa.
La manifestazione è stata selezionata nel 2012 dall’UNAR (Ufficio Nazionale Antidiscriminazioni
Razziali) come buona pratica contro il razzismo. È stata inoltre insignita nel 2011 e nel 2012
della Medaglia d’onore da parte del Presidente della Repubblica.
Appendix 3
Campaign for sustainable tourism
-
IO VADO A LAMPEDUSA
Io questa estate voglio andare in vacanza a Lampedusa
Voglio andarci perché ho visto i suoi abitanti in tv, festeggiare insieme ai migranti brevi
attimi di libertà, perché li ho visti spezzare il pane, in un antico gesto, forse il più antico,
che ha sempre unito le persone, indipendentemente dalla loro provenienza, dal loro status
giuridico, dai loro documenti.
Perché non meritano di vedere il proprio territorio, le proprie strade, occupate e
militarizzate come se le loro giuste e pacifiche rivendicazioni potessero essere affrontate
con il manganello e con la divisa.
Voglio andarci perché mi hanno dato una lezione di civiltà, in un Paese in cui sembrano
trionfare egoismi, barbarie, violenza e razzismo.
Voglio andarci perché nel freddo di gennaio, mi ha scaldato il cuore il valore civico della
protesta dei suoi abitanti. Perché hanno vinto la logica della guerra fra poveri e sono stati
solidali, hanno fatto prevalere l’accoglienza e la solidarietà con le donne e gli uomini
migranti, stipati in condizioni disumane in un centro che doveva essere di primo soccorso
e si è trasformato in una galera.
Voglio andarci, perché è un isola che non merita di vedersi privata del diritto ad essere
parte dell’Europa, perché voglio girarla e ritrovare i volti e gli occhi della bella gente che
invocava libertà e fratellanza.
Voglio andarci perché Lampedusa non può diventare il più grande carcere del
Mediterraneo, vittima sacrificale di governi che non sanno e non hanno saputo mai,
pensare ed attuare politiche sull’immigrazione valide e rispettose dei diritti umani.
Voglio andarci perché non voglio essere complice di chi vuole lasciare, ancora una volta,
Lampedusa e i lampedusani, da soli, a pagare responsabilità non proprie.
Voglio andarci per impedire che il loro magnifico esempio, venga piegato con il ricatto e la
concessione di bisogni di cui dovrebbero godere da sempre, tutte e tutti.
Voglio andarci, forse solo per potere dire a molte e molti di loro "grazie".
I sottoscritti sono coscienti dell’urgenza della situazione a Lampedusa.
Ormai da oltre un mese un migliaio di migranti sono trattenuti in condizioni indegne di
una società civile, ignari della sorte loro riservata, su un’isola di appena 22 chilometri
quadri nella quale vivono circa sei mila abitanti e dove sono già oggi presenti oltre un
migliaio di agenti delle forze dell’ordine.
Tutto ciò rende la situazione esplosiva per esclusiva responsabilità del governo italiano.
I firmatari sono inoltre perfettamente consapevoli del fatto che il carattere civico, solidale,
pacifico, fraterno e largamente condiviso della protesta lampedusana é una cosa
preziosissima e molto fragile.
La spontanea e straordinaria unità mostrata dai lampedusani nell’opporsi all’istituzione di
un Centro di Identificazione ed Espulsione sull’isola e nel rivendicare al contempo i diritti
spettanti loro in quanto cittadini italiani rischia di essere schiacciata da una politica sorda
ed indifferente ai bisogni delle persone che dovrebbe servire.
Il nostro appello è rivolto a quanti non intendono assistere passivamente a ciò che appare
un’ennesima dimostrazione di disprezzo non solo dei diritti dei migranti ma anche della
volontà dei cittadini di Lampedusa e Linosa di vivere dignitosamente; chiediamo a tutti di
mobilitarsi immediatamente a sostegno della protesta tuttora in atto.
Campaign for sustainable toruism: Io questa estate voglio andare in vacanza a Lampedusa
Voglio andarci perché ho visto i suoi abitanti in tv, festeggiare insieme ai migranti brevi
attimi di libertà, perché li ho visti spezzare il pane, in un antico gesto, forse il più antico,
che ha sempre unito le persone, indipendentemente dalla loro provenienza, dal loro status
giuridico, dai loro documenti.
Perché non meritano di vedere il proprio territorio, le proprie strade, occupate e
militarizzate come se le loro giuste e pacifiche rivendicazioni potessero essere affrontate
con il manganello e con la divisa.
Voglio andarci perché mi hanno dato una lezione di civiltà, in un Paese in cui sembrano
trionfare egoismi, barbarie, violenza e razzismo.
Voglio andarci perché nel freddo di gennaio, mi ha scaldato il cuore il valore civico della
protesta dei suoi abitanti. Perché hanno vinto la logica della guerra fra poveri e sono stati
solidali, hanno fatto prevalere l’accoglienza e la solidarietà con le donne e gli uomini
migranti, stipati in condizioni disumane in un centro che doveva essere di primo soccorso
e si è trasformato in una galera.
Voglio andarci, perché è un isola che non merita di vedersi privata del diritto ad essere
parte dell’Europa, perché voglio girarla e ritrovare i volti e gli occhi della bella gente che
invocava libertà e fratellanza.
Voglio andarci perché Lampedusa non può diventare il più grande carcere del
Mediterraneo, vittima sacrificale di governi che non sanno e non hanno saputo mai,
pensare ed attuare politiche sull’immigrazione valide e rispettose dei diritti umani.
Voglio andarci perché non voglio essere complice di chi vuole lasciare, ancora una volta,
Lampedusa e i lampedusani, da soli, a pagare responsabilità non proprie.
Voglio andarci per impedire che il loro magnifico esempio, venga piegato con il ricatto e la
concessione di bisogni di cui dovrebbero godere da sempre, tutte e tutti.
Voglio andarci, forse solo per potere dire a molte e molti di loro "grazie".
Appendix 4
Flyer for the fifth edition of Lampedusa in Festival (March 2013)
-